We combine firm-level trade data from the U.S. Census Bureau with plant-level Toxics Release Inventory data from the Environmental Protection Agency to investigate the impact of firms' imports on toxic emissions by their plants in the US. We find that goods imported from low-wage countries (LWCs) are more pollution-intensive than goods imported from the rest of the world. In addition, firms that import more from LWCs release less toxic emissions and spend less on pollution abatement in the US. According to our estimates, a tenpercentage-point increase in a parent firm's share of imports from LWCs is associated with a 5.8% decrease in its U.S. plants' toxic emissions. These effects are stronger for plants located in dirtier U.S. counties where benefits from pollution reduction are expected to be the largest. These results provide the first large-sample empirical evidence that U.S. firms offshore both production and pollution to the developing world.
I. INTRODUCTION
Between 1992 and 2009, real U.S. manufacturing output has grown significantly, whereas emissions of major air pollutants by U.S. manufacturers, including carbon monoxide and sulfur dioxide, have more than halved ( Figure I ). Much of the pollution reduction has been attributed to strict environment regulations (Chay and Greenston 2005; Shapiro and Walker 2014) , but the regulations have also been blamed for drops in manufacturing productivity (Greenstone, List, and Syverson 2012) , plant closures (Henderson 1996; Becker and Henderson 2000) , losses of American jobs (Greenstone 2002) , and lowered worker earnings (Walker 2013) .
Environmental regulations can reduce pollution through technological innovation in production or abatement processes (Porter and Linde 1995) , or through changes in the compositions of goods manufactured across countries (Copeland and Taylor 1994) ; the latter is facilitated by international trade. According to the Pollution Haven Hypothesis (hereafter PHH), "liberalized trade in goods will lead to the relocation of pollution intensive production from high income and stringent environmental regulation countries to low income and lax environmental regulation countries" (Taylor 2005, p.2) . A corollary of the PHH which predicts that pollution rises in poor countries and falls in rich countries is under close scrutiny. For example, several studies relate the increases in imports to pollution reduction in U.S. manufacturing sector (Ederington, Levinson, and Minier 2008; Levinson 2009 ). Recently, Lin et al. (2014) find that 17-36% of four major anthropogenic air pollutants (SO2, NOx, CO, and black carbon) emitted in China are associated with production of goods for export; about 21% of each of these exportrelated emissions are attributable to China-to-U.S. exports.
However, how much of the pollution reduction can be attributed to emission substitutionbetween pollution emissions in high income and stringent environmental regulation countries and low income and lax environmental regulation countries-at the micro level has not yet been studied. In order to fill this void, we link firm-level imports to plant-level toxic emissions by TRI database discloses toxic emissions by all manufacturing plants with over 10 full-time employees that either use or produce more than threshold amounts of listed toxic substances. We use the combined datasets to estimate the impact of imports by U.S. manufacturing firms on the amount of toxic materials emitted by their domestic plants.
We distinguish between imports from poor or low-wage countries (LWCs) and imports from the rest of the world. We also distinguish between imports from the most polluting countries-where environmental regulations are expected to be lax-and imports from the rest of the world.
2 (I want to add the Lucas, Wheeler, and Hettige study here as a footnote. But there is a large literature on Environmental Kurznet Curve on income and pollution) While imports from LWCs historically have been small, they have increased substantially over the recent years as trade barriers are removed. Between 1992 and 2009, real value of total U.S. imports has more than doubled, whereas real imports from LWCs have grown more than sevenfold. Consequently, the share of real imports from LWCs rose from 7% to about 23% ( Figure II ). While much has been found about how trade with LWCs has caused disruptions to manufacturing industries (Bernard, Jensen, and Schott 2006) , workers and occupations (Ebenstein, et al. 2013) , and local 1 Please refer to Bernard, et al. (2009) for a detailed description of this database.
labor market (Autor, Dorn, and Hanson 2013) , little attention has been paid to the environmental consequences of trading with LWCs.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that LWCs like China and India have been exporting to the U.S. some pollution-intensive products formerly produced in the U.S. At the national level, the increasing share of imports from LWCs in Figure II corresponds to the decreasing air pollution in Figure I . At the industry level, Figure III shows that between 1992 and 2009 the greater the increase in the share of imports from LWCs, the more is the air pollution reduction, also suggesting a potential substitution effect between LWC imports and domestic emissions. Graphic presentation of changes in imports from the most polluting countries (based on CO2 emission per dollar of Gross Domestic Product (GDP)) and changes in toxic air emission shows similar patterns to those in Figure III .
Our firm-and plant-level regressions lend support to the industry-level graphic patterns.
Moreover, they shed light on the relocation and substitution effects predicted by PHH. First, goods imported by U.S. firms from LWCs are more "pollution-intensive" than those imported from the rest of the world. We measure a good's pollution intensity based on its industry's emission per dollar of output in the U.S. Our results imply that goods imported from LWCs are potentially more polluting than goods imported from the rest of the world, assuming these goods were produced based on U.S. technology. Our estimation results suggest that a ten-percentagepoint increase in a firm's share of imports from LWCs ("LWC Import Share") is associated with a 6.7% increase in the pollution intensity of the firm's imported goods.
Secondly, domestic plants pollute less on American soil as their parent firm imports more from LWCs or from the most polluting countries. At the firm level, a ten-percentage-point increase in a parent firm's LWC Import Share is associated with a 5.8% decrease in each of its U.S. plants' toxic emissions, whereas a ten-percentage-point increase in a parent firm's import share from the most polluting countries is associated with a 3.6% decrease in each of its U.S. Finally, we exploit differences between imports from related parties and imports from independent third parties. Imports are categorized in LFTTD database as from related parties if the importer owns, directly or indirectly, 6 percent or more of the exporter. We find some weak evidence that, as U.S. firms import more from their related parties (as opposed to independent parties) in LWCs, the pollution intensity of their imports increases even more and their U.S.
plants pollute even less. However, total imports from related parties in LWCs account for less than 1% of a typical firm's total imports. Our findings suggest that the environmental effects of importing from LWCs are primarily driven by imports from independent parties in LWCs.
We believe these results are the first micro empirical evidence supporting the argument that the U.S. enjoys a cleaner domestic environment partly by importing pollution intensive goods from poor countries. In other words, the "green shift" of U.S. manufacturing is accompanied by a corresponding "brown shift" of imports from poor countries. Previous research on the environmental impact of trade mostly relies on country/industry level information (see, e.g., Grossman and Krueger 1995; Antweiler, Copeland, and Taylor 2001; Gamper-Rabindran 2006a) .
We extend this literature by offering the first empirical evidence of "pollution offshoring" at the firm level. Global trade and investment allows firms to disperse pollution intensive activities in their value chain according to environmental regulations around the globe (Hanna 2010 ).
However, owing principally to a lack of detailed firm-level trade and pollution data, there has been almost no empirical study investigating whether firms indeed offshore the most polluting production processes or source more "dirty" products from abroad. By linking firm-level trade with plant-level emissions/abatement costs data, our study fills an important gap in studies at the intersection between trade and environment. This paper also belongs to a burgeoning literature attempting to explain the reduction in pollution emissions. Our results are not inconsistent with the basic conclusion that trade in general does account for the majority of pollution reduction in the U.S. (Levinson, 2009; Shapiro and Walker 2014) ; we contribute to this literature and highlight the impact of trading with poor countries on firm's emission outcomes.
The issue of U.S. pollution reductions coming at the expense of environmental quality in other countries is at the heart of many recent anti-globalization protests. While pollution is assumed to be local in the original PHH model, it is becoming a global concern. Recent studies show that pollution from China contributes to a significant portion of sulfate concentrations over the western United States (Lin, et al. 2014) . Our findings provide additional empirical support for the call by policy makers for more coordination between international trade agreements and domestic environmental regulations (Keller and Levinson 2002) .
The rest of the article is organized as follows: The following section discusses the details of our data samples and variables. Sections III presents the research design and results. Sections IV concludes.
II. DATA and VARIABLES
We construct our samples, which extend from 1992 to 2009, from several sources. We start with plant-level microdata and firm-level international trade data from the U.S. Census Bureau.
In addition, we use plant-level toxic emissions and abatement costs data published by the U.S.
EPA. A plant -or "establishment" in Census Bureau terminology and "facility" in TRI terminology -is a physical location where economic activity takes place. A firm can own one or multiple plants. We link these datasets by using the existing bridge files maintained by the Census Bureau, and by manually matching plant name and address. We describe the main datasets, the samples, and the key variables below.
Micro Data from the Census Bureau
The Census micro-level datasets on manufacturing plants include the Census of 
Trade Data from Census Bureau
The To identify LWCs, we rely on the list provided by Bernard, Jensen, and Schott (2006) , who classify a country as an LWC if its annual GDP per capita was less than 5% of the U.S.
annual GDP per capita from 1972 to 1992 (Appendix , Table A1 ). China, India, and most African countries are on the list. We calculate a firm's LWC Import Share as the percentage of its imports from LWCs over its total imports. LWC Import Share has risen substantially: from 7%
in 1992 to about 30% in 2009 based on our sample statistics. , Table A2 ).
We match firm-level LFTTD with plant-level microdata in the CM and the ASM through firm-level bridge files provided by the Census Bureau.
Toxics Release Inventory (TRI)
The U.S. EPA's TRI program is the first large-scale initiative to track facility-level Each EPA region has a TRI enforcement program that conducts, on an annual basis, a limited number of data quality inspections (of reporting facilities) and non-reporting inspections (of facilities that are in TRI industries but did not report). Violations, whether stemming from late reporting, failure to report, or data quality issues, can lead to penalties of $25,000 per day, per chemical, per violation, and may be subject to criminal charges. toxicity weighting model provided by the EPA, Risk-Screening Environmental Indicators (RSEI).
We sum up the RSEI-based toxic emissions of all plants in each of the 459 four-digit SICs reported in the 1992 TRI, and scale the emissions by the 1992 industry-level shipment values reported in the NBER-CES Manufacturing Industry Database (Bartelsman and Gray 1996) . 5 We sum up a firm's import value in each 4-digit SIC industry 6 weighted by the corresponding industry-level pollution intensity to derive a firm's overall pollution intensity of its import.
Secondly, we use the TRI database to gauge plant-level toxic emissions within the U.S. We releases on human health. Therefore, we follow recent studies using the RSEI model (e.g.,
Gamper-Rabindran 2006b) to define toxic emissions from a plant as its all-media release of designated toxic chemicals, multiplied by the RSEI toxicity weight for each chemical; emissions to air are weighted using inhalation toxicity weights and emissions to other media are weighted using oral toxicity weights.
Finally, we use the TRI database to approximate the potential benefits from emission reduction and hence the expected environmental pressure on plants in each county. In addition to facility-level emissions, the annual TRI reports and other media sources typically rank counties by total emissions and highlight those most polluting counties. Plants located in "dirty" counties face much greater public pressure to reduce toxic releases than plants located in cleaner counties.
For example, according to Powers (2013) , after Calhoun County, Texas, was listed as having the highest level of toxic releases in the country, local communities organized various awareness programs to inform the public about local pollution. Under public pressure, Alcoa had to commit to aggressive pollution reduction initiatives at two local plants. Similarly, when Butler County, Pennsylvania, was identified among the dirtiest counties, local communities successfully pressured the state into restricting the nitrate emissions of a major steel plant before the plant was allowed to release waste into the Connoquenessing Creek. We rank counties by the total RSEI toxicity-weighted emissions from all plants located there, based on annual emissions data and 1992 emissions data, respectively. We then select the 100 "dirtiest" counties according to the ranking; selecting the 25 or 50 dirties counties generates similar results.
Pollution Abatement Costs and Expenditures
The Pollution Abatement Costs and Expenditures (PACE) survey is the only comprehensive survey of costs of environmental abatement activities in the U.S. The survey collects facilitylevel pollution abatement costs data for manufacturing, mining, and electric utility industries.
The costs are mostly incurred in the process of compliance with local, state, and federal regulations, or for voluntary or market-driven pollution abatement activities. Such costs include pollution treatment (to reduce or eliminate pollution that has been generated during production processes), pollution prevention (to prevent creation of pollution in the first place), recycling, and disposal.
We use the PACE surveys for the years 1992-1994, 1999, and 2005. 7 We use total Pollution Abatement Operating Costs (PAOC), which comprise salaries and wages, parts and materials, fuel and electricity, capital depreciation, contract work, equipment leasing, and additional operating costs associated with abatement of air and water pollution as well as solid waste reduction or disposal. The PAOC index has long been used to measure plants' pollution reduction investments (Pashigian 1984; Jorgenson and Wilcoxen 1990; List and Co 2000) .
Following prior studies, we normalize a plant's PAOC by its number of employees, which reflects an implicit choice between environmental protection and jobs (Becker, Pasurka Jr., and Shadbegian 2013).
8
We match PACE to the trade database LFTTD using Census' common firm identifiers. The match yields 50,318 plant-years over the five years for which PACE data are available.
Samples
We construct two main samples; the first sample includes firm-level data about all manufacturing firms importing in manufacturing industries, and the second sample includes plant-level data about all manufacturing plants who disclose toxic emissions to the EPA and whose parent firms import. We use the first sample to analyze the pollution intensity of imports.
This sample includes 88,458 firms and 277,768 firm-year observations for years 1992-2009.
Panel A in Table I provides summary statistics for this sample. As the panel shows, an average 7
The PACE survey was discontinued in other sample years (1995-1998, 2000-2004, 2006-2009 
III. RESULTS
In this section, we investigate five questions about the environmental impact of firm imports: Are the effects in (A) and (B) stronger when firms import more from related parties in LWCs?
A. Are imports from LWCs dirtier?
To estimate the relation between a firm's LWC Import Share and the pollution content and intensity of its imports, we use the following specification:
Pollution Intensity of Imports = + + LWC Import Share + + (1),
where Pollution Intensity of Import is the overall pollution intensity of firm j's imports; it is the firm's pollute import (value of imports multiplied by industry-level pollution intensity)
scaled by its total imports, as described above, in year t. We use the logarithm of a firm's pollute import as the measure of its pollution content of imports. The key variable of interest, LWC Import Share is also described above. 9 We control for firm j's size (total value of shipment) in addition to firm and year fixed effects and cluster the standard errors at the firm level.
Our results are presented in Table II . We calculate a firm's pollution content and intensity based on IPPS in columns (1) and (3), and we use toxicity information based on TRI in columns (2) and (4); results are very similar across these two intensity measures. Larger firms import more polluting products, although the effects are not statistically significant in columns (3) and (4) when we scale the pollution content by total imports. Our results show that both pollution content and intensity variables of a firm's imports are positively and significantly related to its LWC Import Share. The results reveal that the more a firm imports from LWCs, the greater the intensity of its imports. The economic significance of the point estimate is sizeable. Coefficients in columns (1) and (2) imply that a 10-percentage-point increase in a firm's LWC Import Share is associated with a 10-14% increase in the pollution content of its imports. Coefficients in columns (3) and (4) imply that a 10-percentage-point increase in a firm's LWC Import Share raises the pollution intensity of its imports by about 0.07, approximately 7% of the sample's median value of import intensity.
B. Do domestic plants pollute less when their parent firms import more from low-wage or the most polluting countries?
We proceed to estimate toxic emissions at the plant level using the following specifications:
Toxic Emission = + + LWC Import Share + + (2),
where Toxic Emissions is either the logarithm of the total toxicity-weighted emissions of plant i of parent firm j, or plant i's total toxicity-weighted emissions scaled by the shipment value of its output, in year t. MPC Import Share is the share of imports from most polluting countries by firm j. We control for several plant characteristics, such as the shipment value of its output, the logarithm of its capital expenditures, skill intensity, and the logarithm of its parent firm's total imports. We control for both plant and year fixed effects and cluster the standard errors at the firm level.
We report the estimation results in Table III . Columns (1) and (3) report results using the logarithm of a plant's toxic emission as dependent variables whereas columns (2) and (4) use the logarithm of a plant's toxic emission scaled by its output. The two sets of outcome variables yield qualitatively similar results.
The estimates in columns (1) and (2) show that a firm's LWC Import Share has a significantly negative impact on its domestic plants' overall toxic emissions as well as toxic emissions per dollar of shipment. The economic effect of the point estimates is considerable. For instance, the coefficient of -0.583 in column (1) implies that a 10-percentage-point increase in a parent firm's LWC Import Share lowers its average plant's toxic emissions by about 5.83%. Our results imply that over the 18-year sample period during which the economy-wide share of import from LWCs has increased by 16 percentage points, a plant would reduce its toxic emission by about 9 percentage points, which constitutes about 14% of overall drop in toxic emission levels. Coefficients on other explanatory variables are consistent with our expectation.
In general, larger plants, plants with larger capital expenditures, and plants with a larger proportion of production workers tend to produce higher levels of toxic emissions. Finally, total import does not have a statistically significant impact on toxic emissions, and its inclusion does not qualitatively change the coefficients to LWC Import Share.
The results columns (3) and (4) are qualitatively similar to those in columns (1) and (2) 
C. Is the negative effect of importing from low-wage (or the most polluting) countries on domestic toxic emissions stronger for plants located in dirty U.S. counties?
We next explore the heterogeneous impact of imports across U.S. plants located in different U.S. counties. Dirty U.S. counties could face more public and regulatory pressure to reduce pollution (Environmental Protection Agency 2003; Powers 2013) , therefore the benefit of "pollution offshoring" is greater for both the dirty counties and the plants located in these counties. Accordingly, we estimate the following specifications:
Toxic Emissions = + + 1 LWC Import Share + 2 (LWC Import Share * 100 Dirtiest Counties ) + + (4), Toxic Emissions = + + 1 MPC Import Share + 2 (MPC Import Share *
where 100 Dirtiest Counties it is a dummy variable that represents whether plant i is located in any of the 100 dirtiest U.S. counties in year t (or in 1992, for an alternative specification) based on total toxic emissions.
Tables IV and V report regression results of Equation (4) and (5) based on imports from low-wage countries and the most polluting countries, respectively. The interaction terms are significantly negative, suggesting that the negative impact of imports from low-wage or the most polluting countries on domestic toxic emissions is stronger for plants in dirty U.S. counties. On average across specifications, the negative impact of imports from low-wage or the most polluting countries on domestic emissions is doubled for plants located in the 100 dirties counties, compared to plants located elsewhere. After controlling for these interaction terms, the main effects of LWC Import Share and MPC Import Share remain mostly significantly negative.
D. Do firms importing more from LWCs spend less on pollution abatement in the U.S?
In addition to toxic emissions, we also examine plants' effort to reduce emissions. Table VI estimates specifications similar to Equation (2) and (3), except that we replace the dependent variable of plant toxic emissions with plant expenditures on environmental pollution abatement.
We also replace plant fixed effects with 4-digit SIC industry fixed effects to take into account of significant gaps in time coverage of PACE. Following the prior studies using PACE data, we use both the abatement costs and the abatement costs divided by a plant's total number of employees and obtain similar findings. Results from columns (1) and (2) show that domestic plants spend less on pollution abatement when their parent firms import more from LWCs. The coefficient of -0.151 implies that a 10-percentage-point increase in the parent firm's LWC Import Share reduces its average plant's pollution abatement costs by about 1.51%, and reduces its average plant's pollution abatement costs per worker by about 0.7%.
Columns (3) through (6) suggest that the effect identified above is much stronger for plants located in dirty U.S. counties, where the benefit of "pollution offshoring" is expected to be greater. The negative impact of a U.S. parent firm's LWC Import Share on the pollution abatement costs of its plants in dirty U.S. counties is four times greater than the impact on its plants located in cleaner counties.
E. Do firms importing more from related parties in LWCs import dirtier goods and pollute less on domestic soil?
Finally, we compare the impact of LWC imports through arm's length transactions vs. those from related parties. In Tables VII and VIII , we estimate specifications similar to Equations (1) and (2), respectively, except that we include an additional explanatory variable to measure the share of imports from related parties in LWCs. Table VII shows that adding LWC imports from related parties does not qualitatively change the impact of LWC Import Share on the pollution content or intensity of imports that is estimated in Table II . In addition, columns (1) and (2) suggest that imports from related parties in LWCs further increase the pollution content of the firm's imports. However, columns (3) and (4) suggest that these results do not extend to pollution intensity. Table VIII shows that adding LWC imports from related parties does not qualitatively change the impact of LWC Import Share on plant-level toxic emissions estimated in Table III . In addition, column (1) suggests that LWC imports through related parties further lowers the toxic emissions of domestic plants. However, column (2) suggests that this result does not extend to pollution intensity. Imports from related parties in LWCs do not affect a plant's toxic emission per value of shipment in a significant fashion. On average, in our sample, the imports from related parties in LWCs account for less than 1% of a firm's total imports. Therefore, despite the significant point estimate, the economic significance of importing from related parties in LWCs remains small. In sum, our findings suggest that the environmental effects of importing from LWCs are primarily driven by imports from arm's length transactions with parties in LWCs.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
This paper investigates the relationship between international trade and U.S. firms' strategies in dealing with domestic environmental standards. Our analyses show that, (1) imports by U.S. firms from LWCs are dirtier, (2) U.S. plants pollute less as their parent firms import more from low-wage or the most polluting countries, and this effect is stronger for plants in dirtier U.S. counties, where potential benefits from pollution reduction are expected to be greater,
U.S. plants spend less on pollution abatement as their parent firms import more from low-wage or the most polluting countries, and this effect is stronger for plants in dirtier U.S. counties, and finally, (4) as U.S. firms import more from their related parties in LWCs, the pollution intensity of their imports increases, whereas the toxic emissions of their plants reduces.
We believe these results are the first empirical evidence supporting the argument that the U.S. enjoys a cleaner domestic environment partly by importing pollution intensive goods from poor countries. Furthermore, our results provide indirect support to prior findings that the economic costs of environmental regulations discourage investments in the U.S. while encouraging U.S. imports from abroad. Our paper also represents the first empirical evidence of "pollution offshoring" at the firm level. By linking firm-level trade and plant-level emissions and abatement costs data, our study fills an important gap in studies of trade and the environment. (2). The sample includes all firms that import and are surveyed by the TRI. The dependent variable is a plant's toxic content from all-media pollutant emissions. All regressions include a constant and control for plant and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. ***, **, and * denotes statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. (3). The sample includes all firms that import and are surveyed by the TRI. "100 Dirtiest Counties" refers to the top 100 counties in the US in terms of toxic emissions based on the TRI. All regressions include a constant and control for plant and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. ***, **, and * denotes statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. (3). The sample includes all firms that import and are surveyed by the TRI. "100 Dirtiest Counties" refers to the top 100 counties in the US in terms of toxic emissions based on the TRI. All regressions include a constant and control for plant and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. ***, **, and * denotes statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. . The sample includes all firms that import. We use industry-level pollution intensities based on the IPPS and the TRI and multiply by a firm's import value in each industry to calculate the pollution content and intensity of imports. All regressions include a constant and control for firm and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. ***, **, and * denotes statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
